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There is no doubt that one of the most contentious terrains of 
contestation in the supposed clash of values between Islamism and 
Western values is the role of women in society. Thus, the issue of 
women’s rights has become the litmus test for Arab societies with 
respect to the current zeitgeist of human rights in the age of 
democracy and liberalism. There is today a stereotypical view of 
debates surrounding women’s rights in the Arab world where two 
distinct camps are in conflict with each other. On the one hand there 
are ‘globalised’ liberal and secular actors that strive for women’s 
rights and therefore democracy, while on the other are obscurantist 
movements that are anchored in religious tradition, resist 
globalisation and are therefore autocratic by assumption. This article 
challenges this view and through an empirical study of the changes to 
the Code of Personal Status in Tunisia and Morocco it demonstrates 
that the issue of women’s rights is far more complex and, in particular, 
it finds that there is a very significant decoupling between women’s 
rights and democracy in the region despite a progressive liberal shift 




 The rise of Political Islam1 across the Muslim world has been one of the most 
important political developments of the last four decades, affecting Middle East and 
North African (MENA) as well as international politics. This is for three reasons. First 
of all, despite its varied nature, Political Islam has generally been perceived and dealt 
with as a threat to the domestic stability of MENA states and to international security. 
In this respect, the events of September 11th 2001 simply accelerated the pre-existing 
trend of perceiving Islamist movements as a danger to the predominant values of 
democracy and liberalism.2 Second, the rise of Political Islam posed a significant 
puzzle to scholars and policy-makers alike because religion as a tool for political 
mobilisation seemed surprisingly strong at a time when it was believed that the world 
was becoming increasingly secular. This was occurring at a time when the 
acceleration of what can be termed liberal globalisation, particularly after the end of 
 3
the Cold War, was promoting values, forms of government and economic 
organisation based on the experience of established liberal democracies. Finally, the 
rise of Political Islam seemed to indicate a regression towards religion-based 
governance and policy-making that contrasted sharply with the presumed 
requirements of secular modernity.   
 In this context, there is no doubt that one of the most contentious terrains of 
contestation in this supposed clash of values between Islamism and Western 
modernity is the role of women in society. The issue of women’s rights was for 
instance particularly prominent in the lead up to and aftermath of the invasion of 
Afghanistan, with much emphasis placed on the necessity to liberate women from the 
burqa. The debate about Muslim women and their role in society is not new however 
and it partly harkens back to colonial times. In the early stages of colonisation, 
European occupying powers refrained from heavily interfering in the gender relations 
of the vanquished populations and the representation of Muslim women was a rather 
stereotypical binary one.3 On the one hand, the Muslim Woman was portrayed as 
being a powerless victim in a highly patriarchal society and therefore not a political 
nor social subject in her own right. On the other hand, the Muslim Woman was 
portrayed as a depraved sexual temptress. While colonial authorities were only very 
marginally interested in the idea of the ‘liberation’ of women for a long period of 
time, their interest in the gender question increased when the local nationalist 
movements began to grow and seriously challenge the colonial powers.4 At the time, 
the question of women’s role in society emerged as contentious, with colonial 
authorities attempting to utilise ‘women’s rights’ to weaken nationalist demands. 
Conversely, nationalist movements emphasised the role of women in the liberation 
struggle as they became the ‘mothers of the country’ that would be born out of the 
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liberation and anti-colonial struggle. This trend was most evident in Algeria where 
French occupation lasted for over a century, where the war of liberation was 
prolonged and where women in the Algerian liberation movement had a prominent 
role. According to Kandiyoti by virtue of her biological role as creator of life the 
‘Woman’, in nationalist discourse, reproduces ethnic boundaries and passes down 
culture to the progeny.5 The Woman is therefore the representative of national 
differences, but her full citizenship is not guaranteed. There are obviously national 
differences in the Muslim and Arab world relating to the emergence of the gender 
question during colonial times, but there is nevertheless a similar trajectory in so far 
as the Woman, in its social and political role, seems to become the point of 
contestation for different sets of values.     
Along similar lines, the issue of gender has taken again centre stage more 
recently. The previous ‘essentialisation’ of women by the colonial West and the 
indigenous nationalist movements is again played out today in the context of liberal 
globalisation. Thus, the issue of women’s rights has become the litmus test of the 
supposed homogeneity of the current zeitgeist of human rights in the new economic 
liberal context. This dominant discourse of liberal and democratic globalisation goes 
hand in hand with the separation of Church and State, which is believed to be a 
necessary component of modern governance.6 It follows that countries across the 
globe are encouraged to replicate the Western model of social and political 
development because it is the only avenue that can lead to the establishment of an 
effective liberal-democratic state with all the perceived positive benefits this has. The 
relegation of religion to the private sphere is conceived of as a condicio sine qua non 
for democracy and the emergence of political-religious actors is perceived as a threat 
to such modernisation because they promote illiberal policies, which fundamentally 
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undermine the perceived unbreakable bond between democracy and liberal rights. In 
the Muslim world today, the strength of Islamist movements and their defence of 
traditions are often considered an obstacle to democracy because, on the whole, 
Islamists reject many of the values of liberal globalisation. This creates a stereotypical 
view of debates surrounding women’s rights7 in the Arab world where two distinct 
camps are in conflict with each other. On the one hand there are ‘globalised’ liberal 
and secular actors that strive for women’s rights and therefore democracy, while on 
the other are obscurantiste religious movements that are anchored in tradition, resist 
globalisation and are therefore autocratic by assumption.8   
Building on Svensson, who argued ‘that the problem is often presented as 
primarily an ideological one, a conflict between a local tradition, Islam, and the global 
demands for human rights’,9 this article challenges the dichotomy that is prevalent in 
studies surrounding the issue of women’s rights in the Arab world in the context of 
globalisation and democratisation. In order to do so, it will demonstrate that, first of 
all, there exist alternatives to the mainstream discourse of liberal globalisation and 
that other ‘types’ of globalisation can be just as valid and politically effective, namely 
a type of Islamic globalisation based on extensive transnational links.10 Second, there 
is very little empirical evidence of the linkage between secular political actors 
operating in favour of liberal women’s rights and their attachment to meaningful 
political change. If anything, there is currently an inverse relationship between the 
two as the introduction of progressive and liberal reforms in the realm of women’s 
rights strengthens the regime, at least in the short run.11 This means that, 
paradoxically, secular actors might be working against the introduction of democracy. 
Third, the supposedly anti-women ethos of Islamist movements needs to be disputed 
for two reasons. Firstly, their opposition to modifications in the traditional legislation 
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of personal status issues is derived from political considerations rather than from an 
ideological position related to the role of women in society. Secondly, for some 
movements this issue is not as relevant as others might be, such as genuine access to 
the political system. This is due to the fact that not all Islamist movements share the 
same ideological tenets or the same policies and that they operate in different national 
contexts.  
 By focusing on the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, where women’s rights are 
prominent in the public debate between different political actors, both religious and 
secular, the article will illustrate how these actors operate within the constraints and 
opportunities that globalisation provides. The picture that emerges is a much more 
complex one than the simple dichotomy highlighted above. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 While there are a significant number of different definitions and 
interpretations of globalisation12  it can be convincingly argued that, from a purely 
political point of view, there exist core elements to it coinciding with the experience 
and institutions of established liberal democracies. There is very little doubt that the 
most significant core element of globalisation is the global integration of previously 
‘closed’ national economies and the profound transformations that this passage to one 
world economy entails. This process has been driven since the late 1970s by the 
shifting paradigm of economic organisation, especially in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Subsequently, the Single European Act of 1987 signalled that 
continental Europe was ready to embrace neo-liberal economics and the collapse of 
the Soviet block accelerated the export of neo-liberalism to all corners of the globe. 
The opening up of national economies in order to reap the benefits of integration 
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would also lead, according to this mainstream interpretation of globalisation, to social 
and political benefits as well.  
According to this view, the creation of a neo-liberal economy where 
transnational linkages are of the utmost importance in both trade and finance requires 
the establishment of the rule of law.13 In turn, once the rule of law is established, 
democracy and human rights will most likely follow. There is therefore a very 
intimate and almost natural connection to the idea that globalisation contributes to the 
expansion of democracy and human rights. Griswold states that ‘the connection 
between trade, development, and political reform is not just a throwaway line. In 
theory and in practice, economic and political freedoms reinforce one another.’14 It 
follows that democratisation fuels even more globalisation and development in a 
mutually reinforcing process.15 Policy makers in the western world subscribe quite 
fully to this idea, which is also rhetorically embraced in a number of developing 
countries where current authoritarian rulers, forced to open up the country’s economy, 
feel the need to continue to justify and legitimise their rule by making references to 
democratic discourse and practices even though they might not uphold them in 
reality.16 This interpretation of what we term liberal globalisation is disputed in many 
quarters, but it is undeniable that is dominant in policy-making circles. Thus, the 
architecture of international structures of governance comprises not only formal and 
informal organisations and networks managing global trade, but also institutions of a 
political nature with the objective of sustaining economic integration with political 
and social reforms. Thus, there exist countless programmes, treaties, binding 
declarations and conventions emphasising the need to extend liberal rights and 
democracy world-wide.  
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A central tenet of the policies of democratisation implemented by Western 
countries building on the belief in liberal globalisation is the transformation in the 
Arab world of the perceived submissive role of women. In January 2002, the Freedom 
House President Adrian Karatnycky enumerated the reasons at the root of the 
democratic deficit of the Muslim world and placed the legal discrimination against 
women in second place of importance.17 Thus the rights of Muslim women began to 
surf the ‘democratic wave’ that submerged Afghanistan and Iraq. Coleman also 
highlights how gender equality has ‘become a much more prominent issue’18 for the 
USA in the Arab world and is met with a corresponding growth of domestic pressure 
from certain sectors of society to increase women’s participation in the political, 
economic and social life of the country. This was, for example, the case in the Gulf 
Peninsula in the late 1990s, when a number of regimes did indeed broaden women’s 
participation under both internal and international pressures.19 Thus, the legal and 
political architecture of liberal globalisation provides different opportunities and 
constraints for political actors in the Arab world by virtue of its normative values 
because such values might not be perceived to be universal by significant sectors of 
many societies across the globe.    
Thus, the contestation of liberal globalisation, in the Arab world as elsewhere, 
has generated a ‘global’ reaction in the name of traditionalism and defence of 
indigenous values. While not entirely de-linked from demands for a fairer 
redistribution of resources in the context of a profound unjust neo-liberal economy 
that characterise alter-globalisation movements in the West as well, such contestation 
has found an equally fertile terrain on cultural issues, to which ordinary citizens seem 
to be very sensitive. In the Maghreb, as elsewhere in the Arab world, the political 
debate is for instance rarely as intense when discussing personal status legislation and 
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by implication women’s rights. This debate is often framed around a dichotomy 
whose constitutive variables are on the one hand democracy-modernity and on the 
other Arab-Muslim identity. The flag-bearers of the defence of traditionalism are 
Islamist movements and their discourse is particularly successful partly because of the 
difficulties of Arab nation states to withstand post-colonial cultural penetration from 
global models of behaviour and social arrangements. Paradoxically, this defence of 
traditionalism is often couched the language of human rights and democracy20 and is 
carried out through technological and ideological processes that characterise liberal 
globalisation because the ‘shrinking’ of the world has allowed trans-nationalism 
outside the liberal mainstream also to flourish. In the Muslim world, parallel to 
governmental adaptations to the requirements of liberal globalisation, we also see 
counter-hegemonic processes at play that involve state, sub-state and supra-state 
entities with agendas, values and political objectives that differ significantly from the 
mainstream. Thus, what we term ‘Islamic globalisation’ also influences local political 
actors, providing an alternative set of constraints and opportunities. Also 
paradoxically, one of the central issues of Islamic globalisation, bound up with the 
wider project of defending Arab-Muslim identity, is the role for women in society, 
their portrayal, their rights and their duties. Islamic globalisation also offers a number 
of alternative social models for Muslim women and families and this has important 
repercussions in the different Arab states where the ‘Woman’ has become, as 
mentioned above, a symbolic terrain of political struggles.  
This discussion of different types of globalisation leads to the second aspect of 
conventional wisdom that we attempt to challenge, namely that the secular sectors of 
MENA societies are inherently pro-democracy and the religious ones inherently 
autocratic. The problem here is the conflation of secularism with democracy and the 
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conflation of liberalism with democratic procedures. While this reflects the European 
experience of dividing Church and State and the combining of liberal rights with 
democratic procedures, the reality on the ground in the MENA is different. First of all 
empirical studies indicate that the degree of religiosity of ordinary citizens does not 
influence their preference for democracy, which is considered to be a desirable form 
of government by the majority of MENA citizens.21 Second, in the aggregate, it is 
quite impossible to determine the nature of a political movement in isolation and it is 
therefore specious to argue that Islamist movements are naturally authoritarian and 
the secular ones naturally democratic. The need for context is paramount and when 
this institutional context is taken into account, the simplistic distinction between 
authoritarian Islamists and democratic seculars is no longer convincing.22 In fact, 
when one analyses the relationships between political actors in the MENA, it emerges 
that quite often avowedly secular parties and associations side with authoritarian 
ruling elites, perceived to be defending some sort of state’s laicité against Islamist 
aggression.23 The best example of this type of behaviour is in Algeria where almost 
all secular parties and personalities called for the military to carry out a military coup 
in order to stop the Islamist FIS from taking legitimate power through the ballot box 
in 1992.24 Conversely, Islamist movements are increasingly calling for democratic 
practices and procedures to be implemented while, at the same time, adapting their 
discourse to one more attuned towards global, and by implication liberal, human 
rights. This is most evident in the Turkish case,25 but it is increasingly so across the 
Arab world. This does not mean that the Islamist rhetoric on democracy should be 
‘politically’ believed, but it simply indicates that the dichotomy pro-democratic 
secularism versus authoritarian Islamism is problematic. In spite both of this and of 
studies confirming the democratic potential of Islamist movements,26 Western 
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institutions, both state and non-state, deal almost exclusively with secular associations 
and ruling regimes, because they are perceived as truly democratic or potentially so. 
This practice contributes to reinforce the divide between different sectors of society in 
the MENA, particularly within the opposition, while allowing ruling elites to divide 
and conquer ‘genuine’ opposition movements.27          
 The simplistic and politically motivated manner in which Islamist and secular 
activism at the level of party politics and civil society in the Arab world is constructed 
is very much in evidence when it comes to the issue of women’s rights, which have 
become a terrain for the struggle between secularism and religious tradition with 
profound implications for democratisation. The opportunities that liberal globalisation 
has provided for secular women’s rights organisations in the MENA to achieve a 
complete reform of personal status legislation or an amelioration of existing legal 
provisions have been numerous and effective. Al-Ali argues that one of the factors 
‘which have helped the rise of independent women’s organisations in some countries 
is the increased influence of international constituencies’.28 In addition, the United 
Nations claims that ‘four world conferences on women convened by the UN in the 
past quarter of a century have been instrumental in elevating the cause of gender 
equality to the very centre of the global agenda.’29 Moreover, the linkage of gender 
equality to the issue of economic development has prompted many MENA 
governments to face the issue of personal status legislation because of the necessity to 
link the country to the architecture of international development in order to obtain aid 
and recognition. For example, the World Bank is particularly active in promoting 
action plans geared towards the integration of women to national development goals 
which require legislative reforms on matters related to personal status. Santostefano 
highlights that ‘since 1995 the World Bank commitment to women and gender has 
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been enshrined in two documents: the 2001 Engendering development: through 
gender equality in rights, resources and voice and the 2002 Integrating gender into 
the World bank: a strategy for action.’30 Conversely, liberal globalisation seems to 
have become a constraint for many local women’s rights associations because of the 
accusation of identity-betrayal that the traditionalists can hurl at them. Islamist 
movements do indeed claim that changes to personal status legislation are simply the 
outcome of external pressures and are dictated by the cultural and economic 
expansionism of the West, which wishes to change societies in its mould. This 
reaction in the name of the defence of Arab-Muslim identity and anti-imperialism is at 
times very successful because of the poor image of the West in the Arab world due to 
the former’s foreign policies and the generally more conservative nature of society. It 
is here that Islamic globalisation provides the opportunity for local Islamist 
movements to link their struggles, even the ones over the reform of personal status 
legislation, to a wider Arab struggle to withstand Western expansionism whereby 
Islamism becomes a synonym for mouqqawama (resistance). This resistance is 
however quite disconnected from both democracy and women’s rights per se.   
As demonstrated in other studies, progressive reforms on personal status 
legislation do not necessarily lead to a democratisation of the polity31 and women’s 
rights organisations need the collaboration and sanctioning of the authoritarian regime 
to achieve their objectives, paradoxically strengthening the very authoritarianism that 
they challenge in many other respects. For Islamists, opposition to changes in 
personal status legislation is often couched in the language of democracy as the views 
of the majority of society, generally opposed to such changes, are not taken into 
account. In addition, most Islamists are not against changes towards gender equality 
per se and tend to utilise the issue for political visibility. There are two issues here 
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that it is worth mentioning. First of all, Islamist movements are often more open to the 
political participation of women than their secular counterparts in many Arab 
countries.32 For instance, women constitute more than 50 per cent of the membership 
of the Moroccan Islamist Justice and Charity Group, leading numerous activities and 
fully participating in the activities of the association.33 This indicates that some Arab 
women, equally the well educated, have reservations about the liberal language of 
change surrounding personal status issues and might prefer an Islamic alternative. 
Secondly, a number of Islamist movements ideologically accept the necessity of 
changes with respect to women’s rights, but contend that the justification for such 
changes should be found in indigenous values and traditions rather than on ‘alien’ 
ones imported by the west. 
 In conclusion, the problematisation of the concept of globalisation, the de-
linking of secularism and democracy, and a change in the perception of Political Islam 
contribute to help dismantle three widely held notions, that: 1) the ‘game’ surrounding 
the advancement of women’s rights in the Arab world is solely a product of liberal 
globalists; 2) it can be inevitably coupled with more fundamental democratic changes 
and 3) it depends on the degree of secularism of the protagonists. The cases of Tunisia 
and Morocco are helpful in highlighting the much more complex picture of the 
trajectory of women’s rights and the actors involved in this issue.            
   
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN MOROCCO AND TUNISIA 
Despite a similar historical background that saw both countries becoming 
colonies of France and achieve independence in the same year (1956), the trajectory 
of women’s rights and personal status legislation in the post-colonial period took a 
very different route in Morocco and Tunisia. As Charrad demonstrated in her study, 
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Tunisia adopted a fairly liberal code thanks to the autonomy the new ruling elites 
enjoyed over tribes and lineages while the King of newly independent Morocco 
needed tribal support to outmanoeuvre the nationalist parties and remain the sole 
political arbiter of the new system.34 The source of tribal power stems from the 
inability of the individual to choose autonomously the creation of marriage bonds 
because marriage must be functional to the collective tribal interests. This means that, 
politically, the tribe can provide support for ruling elites in exchange for the 
maintenance of personal status legislation that privileges collective rights over 
individual rights. Where, as in Tunisia, the nationalist movement did not need the 
support of tribal power, its leaders were able to shape personal status legislation in 
order to implement their vision of a modern Tunisia. As Grami asserts, ‘the Code of 
Personal Status (CPS) was not a response from the state to women’s claims and 
pressures, but a political decision taken by political leaders and urban reformists.’35 
Where, as in Morocco, two loci of power, the monarchy and the nationalist parties, 
battled it out for supremacy in the post-colonial political system, the support of tribes 
became a decisive factor to determine the winner. After independence, as Chaarani 
explains, Muslim scholars toyed with the idea of ‘Islamicising’ the entire corpus of 
Moroccan legislation, but the project was never carried out because of the opposition 
of large sectors of the nationalist movement. The scholars were made accept French 
codes and legislation, but obtained that the CPS would not be modified along the lines 
of the Tunisian one.36       
Consequently the development of the women’s rights issue in the two 
countries, including the activism of both liberal/secular women’s rights associations 
and Islamists, has differed considerably over time. In Tunisia, women’s organisations 
were quite quickly integrated into the corporatist structures of the state because they 
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were considered to be a vital contributor to the development of the nation. This 
feminism from above was instrumental to the project of Tunisian national 
development that the ruling elites had in mind.37 It follows that the state became the 
guarantor of women’s rights with the CPS being the most liberal in the Arab world 
and a pillar of the modernising image of Tunisia. This means that there was little 
militant activism on the part of women’s organisations on the issue of women’s rights, 
as the State had granted them an egalitarian CPS and had no intention of revoking it. 
In Morocco, women’s rights activism was channelled through opposition left-wing 
parties in opposition to the Monarchy and this greater struggle against authoritarian 
rule took precedence for quite some time over the struggle for gender equality.38 The 
failure of Moroccan political parties to incorporate gender issues in a serious and 
coherent manner provoked the growing disaffection of many female party members, 
who, over time left the parties to become civil society activists in order to promote 
their agenda of gender equality.39  
The collapse of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s and the consequent 
acceleration of a liberal globalisation built on the values of democracy and human 
rights offered new opportunities and constraints to all the local actors regarding the 
opening up of the respective political systems. The contemporaneous acceleration of 
Islamic globalisation also has a profound impact.  
Starting in the late 1980s MENA authoritarian regimes began suffering from a 
deep crisis of internal legitimacy and faced mounting international scrutiny and 
criticism, as they were under pressure to conform to the new dominant institutions and 
values. For women’s groups however, the time was highly favourable to their gender 
equality agenda, as it coincided with the zeitgeist of human rights and development. 
The linkage made at international level between gender equality and the integration of 
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women into economic development constituted a significant opportunity for women’s 
rights groups to argue that their demands were not simply aimed at individual 
satisfaction, but also beneficial to the economic growth of the nation. This point 
would become increasingly important from the mid-1990s with the involvement of 
international financial institutions and their campaigns to highlight the link between 
underdevelopment and the absence of women’s rights. Paradoxically, the acceleration 
of liberal globalisation provided a powerful political opportunity for Islamist 
movements to assert their public role and presence as the only defenders of Arab-
Muslim identity from the encroachment of what they perceived to be Western cultural 
imperialism. The Gulf War of 1991 against Iraq, which had been presented worldwide 
as the affirmation of the values of a new world order based on the respect of 
international legality and economic openness, was widely perceived in the Arab world 
as an attack on Arab Muslims. Islamist movements across the region capitalised on 
the war by arguing that Western imperialism resorted to the use of violence to make 
dissenting voices conform to the new world realities. Their success in presenting the 
Gulf War in such a manner was not confined to the ‘usual Islamist suspects’, as the 
Western intervention in Iraq also led many in the secular camp to question the validity 
of the values of liberal globalisation such as democracy and human rights given the 
hypocrisy that existed in relation to how Iraq and Israel were treated. As prominent 
feminist and president of the Union de l’Action Féminine (UAF) Latifa Jbabdi 
affirmed, the Gulf War ‘perturbed our way of thinking and operating, it is a scar in 
our being and in our Arab dignity…[this event] pushed us to reconsider our position 
towards Islam, this history which we had denied and marginalised. It is about time 
that we revised [what we think and what we do]’.40  
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At the same time though Political Islam faced a major constraint carried 
through the acceleration of Islamic globalisation. While the latter indeed provided 
local Islamist movements with transnational links they could borrow ideas and 
strategies from, it also favoured the expansion of an anti-Islamic discourse within the 
Arab regimes and the secular opposition. Such discourse was crystallised by the 
events in Algeria during the 1990s when the savagery of the civil war painted all 
Islamists as dangerous extremists bent on constructing a medieval state with no 
political role for women. However, this only partly offset the gains that Islamic 
globalisation had provided for Islamists across the Maghreb thanks to the expansion 
of satellite television and internet, which have created an Arab and Islamic public 
space with which both the regimes and secular actors have to contend.41 This is 
because the channels from the Gulf have over time become quite important both in 
terms of religious and entertainment programmes they offer where ‘Middle Eastern 
rather than North African modes of social behaviour and values influence many 
ordinary citizens’.42 In addition, the increasing difficulties that Europe placed on the 
movement of people between the two banks of the Mediterranean drove large sectors 
of the bourgeoisie of the Maghreb towards the Gulf and Egypt where they came into 
contact with different cultural models that tend to replace the Western one.43 In the 
face of these perceived political and social threats, it is no surprise that a coincidence 
of interests between the regime, afraid of the growth of political Islam, and the secular 
elements of society, under threat from an expanding social model which they could 
and still cannot reconcile, developed over time. The terrain of women’s rights became 
the theatre where these relations are played out.       
The combined effect of these global forces structures the behaviour of the 
local actors, resulting in dynamics that in both Tunisia and Morocco are at time 
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similar and at times radically different. This is because when globalisation encounters 
the local, the indigenous context reacts differently. In 1993, both the Tunisian 
republican regime and the Moroccan monarchy, having understood the importance of 
women’s rights in the polarising contest between secular and Islamist opposition 
carried out a limited, but very important and symbolic reform of the CPS. In Tunisia, 
the CPS was amended, for example, by the abolition of the wife’s duty to obedience. 
Also, a fund was introduced to secure alimony for divorced women and their children. 
In Morocco, the most important innovations to the CPS were the introduction of the 
public and explicit assent of the bride to marriage and the abolition of the institution 
of the wali (legal tutor) for orphaned women. In addition restrictions were placed on 
polygamy and repudiation. Obviously, the reforms in Tunisia simply built on an 
existing liberal code while the reforms in Morocco only introduced minor changes to 
a restrictive code. Nevertheless, the process of reform was highly symbolical because 
it signalled that both regimes were on the side of women’s rights and only through the 
current rulers further changes could be achieved. The signal was for the benefit of 
both domestic actors and the international community. 
In Tunisia, the reform was a continuation of a long-standing policy of the 
regime, which had, since independence, promoted gender equality and it reasserted 
that this was a priority at a time when opposition to the regime was increasing, 
because of the absence of political pluralism. In this context it is interesting to note 
that the Islamists in Tunisia were used as the bogey men of women’s rights in order to 
solidify the alliance with large sectors of urban francophone women, although 
Islamists at the time in Tunisia were not really concerned with the issue of the CPS. 
As Allani argues, contrary to what occurred in former President’s Bourguiba’s time, 44 
‘the [Islamic] Movement [at the time of Bin Ali] expressed… the need to safeguard 
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the previously acquired rights for women that appeared in Code du Statut 
Personnel.’45 In spite of the absence of hostility towards the CPS on the part of the 
Tunisia Islamists, the issue has continued to be present in Tunisian politics and is 
repeatedly used by the regime to polish its external image. This is successful for two 
reasons. On the one hand, there has been an effective Islamisation from below in 
Tunisia and displays of public piety are on the increase; Islam is much more public 
than it was a decade ago. This is due to the very significant presence of media from 
the Gulf offering an image of the role and behaviour of women that is much more 
traditional and conservative. A number of ordinary Tunisians have been influenced in 
their life-style choices by this.46 This Islamisation is perceived to be a problem by a 
number of secular women’s rights groups in the country and worries the Tunisian 
left.47 On the other hand, there is a fracture in the CPS between the de jure provisions 
and the reality on the ground because ‘Tunisian society seems to resist State-enacted 
legal rules in a field where ancestral habits, somewhat redefined, still persist.’48 All 
this is not the product of Islamist activism, which is heavily repressed in Tunisia and 
has been for two decades, but Islamism is still quite a useful scapegoat for the regime. 
There are certainly real fears of extremism in certain secular sectors of civil society, 
but they tend to be exploited by the regime.  
In Morocco the issue of women’s rights has been prominent since 1993, which 
is considered ‘year zero’ by Nezha Sqalli in terms of the promotion of women’s 
rights.49 The 1993 reform was a mixed bag for the women’s rights movement. On the 
one hand, they were dissatisfied with the breadth of the reforms, which did not go far 
enough to even begin to dismantle the patriarchal nature of the Code. On the other 
hand however, they were very grateful for the intervention of the King because his 
legitimacy silenced the verbal attacks to which they had been subjected by the 
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Islamist camp. By clearly stating that he was the only authority in the country with the 
religious legitimacy to deal with the issue, the monarch certainly marginalised the 
women’s rights movement, but, at the same time, he put an end to the Islamists’ 
threats and accusations against women’s rights groups and admitted that changes were 
needed.50 Contrary to Tunisia, women’s rights became much more politicised because 
the context of the reform was radically different in Morocco. The Tunisian big push 
towards gender equality had been made at independence by autonomous ruling elites 
operating in a context where western modernity had appeal, while the reform of the 
Code in Morocco was taking place in a much more globalised world, where the 
appeal and trust in Western institutions and values had decreased considerably. It 
follows that women’s rights in Morocco became a much larger political issue that 
allowed Islamist political movements and tendencies, whose strength  had been 
dismissed previously as irrelevant,51 the opportunity to demonstrate their strength and 
popularity in society. Playing on the issue of Arab-Muslim identity and Moroccan 
traditions, Islamists began to oppose women’s associations and their demands. This 
struggle against the reform was instrumental in structuring and institutionalising a 
previously nebulous Islamism into a much more coordinated movement. It is possibly 
not a surprise that the most virulent attacks against women’s rights groups were 
published in the newspaper al-Raya, directed at the time by Abdelillah Benkirane who 
is currently a leading member of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development, which 
was formed in the mid-1990s. The paradox of the developments of 1993 in Tunisia 
and Morocco is that, despite rather different premises, there is today a very similar 
situation with the regime having taken the role of promoter of women’s rights. Bin 
Ali and his wife are the patrons of gender equality52 and the Moroccan Monarch is 
known as the ‘Roi des Femmes.’ The changes made to the CPS with the sweeping 
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2004 reform53 allow Morocco, just like Tunisia, to have a relatively democratising 
and modernising image abroad.   
  The reaction to the strategy of instrumental use of the women’s rights issues 
in Tunisian and Moroccan associational life presents a number of interesting 
variations despite the fact that there is an overarching similarity in the outcomes, 
which have seen a strong rapprochement between women’s rights groups and ruling 
regimes that have strengthened authoritarian practices rather than weakening them.54 
In Tunisia, the domestic environment allows women to openly declare and ‘live’ their 
laicité55 and to subscribe to the values that the regime also supports when it comes to 
the issue of women’s rights. However, the Tunisian domestic structures also heavily 
constrain, much more than in Morocco, public debate and political pluralism on all 
other issues. It is a highly authoritarian regime with no toleration for domestic voices 
despite a pluralist façade. In this context women’s groups are quite constrained when 
tackling wider issues of political pluralism and democracy, leading them to 
overemphasise the threat of Islamist intégrisme. For a number of activists, fighting 
against fundamentalism is a profoundly democratic struggle and this inevitably 
associates them to the regime, which holds a similar discourse, but anti-Islamist 
activism is the only field where a degree of freedom of expression actually exists.   
With the exception of the Ligue Démocratique des Droits des Femmes, 
Moroccan women’s rights groups display three types of attitudes in this new context 
where women’s rights have risen to prominence in the royal strategy of development. 
First of all, unlike their Tunisian counterparts, activists tend to ignore the Islamists. 
This means that they do not seek a confrontation with them nor they seek a dialogue56 
and barely acknowledge their existence. For example, when human rights of Islamists 
are abused, women’s rights groups remain largely silent, indicating thus that their 
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priorities lie with the narrower interests of women’s rights rather than broad human 
rights. This also explains why their declarations on further changes on the family code 
such as equal treatment in inheritance legislation are often attacked by Islamists, 
while when other human rights groups call for the same changes there is no such 
strong reaction from Islamists given that the framing of the discourse is different and 
that changing the family code again is only one of the many objectives of 
organisations broadly defending human rights.57 Secondly, women’s rights groups 
take advantage of the opportunities that this new situation has created and utilise the 
very discourse of the monarchy about development and gender to advance their 
agenda. Women’s rights groups are relatively powerful political entrepreneurs, often 
able to obtain significant benefits despite the absence of widespread popularity within 
society. This is  due largely to the support they have within the regime, which uses the 
issue of women’s rights to gain external legitimacy and, at the same time, to gain the 
allegiance of sectors of society where liberal ideals have made inroads.  Finally, 
women’s rights organisations are moving away from more traditional battles about the 
family code and are engaged in an attempt to increase the political participation of 
women in elected institutions. This is a way to wriggle out of the ideological debate 
about French-style laicité and traditional values and concentrate on an issue that 
Islamists themselves do not find particularly controversial such as political 
participation of women in politics.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The outcome of these dynamic relations is that there is a very significant 
decoupling between women’s rights and procedural democracy/democratisation. 
Thus, one of the pillars of liberal globalisation, namely the inevitability of the three-
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way linkage between economic liberalism, liberal legislation and democracy, does not 
seem to hold true in the case of Morocco and Tunisia. In both countries a progressive 
liberal shift in the gender equality agenda has been witnessed since the 1990’s. This 
has been more strongly pronounced in Morocco than in Tunisia where a quite liberal 
CPS already existed, but the direction of the changes is quite clear and, from a 
western liberal normative point of view, certainly positive. The reforms that began for 
both countries in 1993 indicate that the weight of liberal globalisation with its 
emphasis on democracy and human rights was considerable in the decision of the 
Tunisian president and the Moroccan monarchs to tackle the issue of women’s rights, 
in addition to a number of other institutional reforms destined to present the countries 
as if on the way to democracy. At the same time, the 1993 reforms and the subsequent 
ones were the product of domestic social changes with economically independent 
women demanding more equality through civil society organisations. The needs of the 
regime to polish their international image and the demands of women’s rights groups 
created a dynamic of change that is responsible for the advances that Tunisia and 
Morocco made in terms of women’s rights when compared to other Arab countries. 
These liberal outcomes have however been achieved in a context of growing social 
Islamisation and ‘authoritarian upgrading’58 breaking the assumption of the virtuous 
cycle between economic globalisation, secularism and democracy. Quite 
paradoxically, the implementation of the new provisions of the CPS in both countries 
might not have occurred if society in both countries had not gone through a process of 
Islamisation that still now characterises them. It is in fact the perceived or real menace 
of Islamism that helps cementing an ‘unholy’ alliance between women’s rights groups 
steeped in the values of democracy and authoritarian elites. The latter that are using 
women’s rights as the credo of the regime in order to extract international legitimacy 
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and benefits from Western countries afraid of the rise of Islamism and beholden to 
secular constituencies that do not have much popularity.59 This has created, in Tunisia 
and Morocco, a number of different political poles. There are pro-democracy secular 
movements in opposition that tend to privilege democratic demands for genuine 
political pluralism over what they tend to perceive as more divisive demands such as 
women’s rights. These actors therefore refuse to collaborate with the regime unless 
very significant changes are made to the structure of decision-making. This would be 
the case of the ‘Democratic Way’ party or the Moroccan Association of Human 
Rights (AMDH) in Morocco and the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) in 
Tunisia. This does not mean that they do not fear Islamists and are not opposed to 
them, but believe that the problem of political Islam should be solved after the current 
regime has been made retreat towards more democratic practices. There are then 
Islamist movements whose main preoccupations are not women’s rights and lifestyle 
decisions, but believe that it is first and foremost necessary to reform the current 
political system. Tunisian Islamists of the Ennadha movement had made this decision 
in the late 1980s, while in Morocco the popular al-Adl does not seem to be as 
interested in women’s rights per se and is more concerned with wider issues of 
authoritarianism and social injustice. There are then Islamist groups, such as the The 
Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) in Morocco, that have been able to occupy a 
prominent role in society precisely because of their very conservative agenda which 
included opposition to the family code reforms. The issue was used to restructure and 
to a certain extent unify the type of Islamism that now characterises the Justice and 
Development Party (PJD), which, quite controversially, accepts the primacy of the 
Monarch in politics. Finally, there are those secular groups that have accepted, to 
different degrees, the idea of a strong leadership promoting women’s rights. For them, 
 25
this is a necessity for the struggle of the advancement of democracy because the 
promotion of women’s rights can, according to these groups, foster democratic 
change and genuine pluralism. It is on this belief that many Moroccan feminists now 
emphasise the importance of women’s participation in elected institutions. The 
discourse of left-wing parties whereby women’s rights will be the product of 
democracy is for many feminists now discredited because it has failed to deliver any 
significant change.     
The ‘unholy alliance’ mentioned above enjoys the support of the most 
important international actors and this helps the Moroccan King and the Tunisian 
President to forge the image of modernisers, which they then re-invest at home with 
key constituencies. The cases of Tunisia and Morocco highlight how the simplistic 
assumptions about globalisation, democratisation and secularism have to be 
problematised when encountering complex local realities and a range of different 
political entrepreneurs.                        
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